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In recent decades Islamic political thinkers have begun to take a strong interest
in democratic thought and politics. Their discussions have progressed beyond the
naı̈ve and superficial task of finding expressions, taken from traditional Islamic
political thought and practice, that can be used to translate modern democratic
idioms (e.g., ‘shura’ and ‘democracy’). Many of them are discussing some of the
most difficult, interesting, and characteristic subjects of theoretical democratic
discourse such as secularism, pluralism, popular sovereignty, individual rights,
and freedom of expression.
In the present article I focus on the concept of public reason. This concept has
come to occupy an important place in Western discussions of democratic
decision making but has yet to be discussed adequately by Islamic thinkers. I
intend to ascertain Islamic views and reactions to the notion of public reason as
this has been developed in the writings of John Rawls and others. I also discuss
concepts of reason in Islamic discourses, including the notion of an ‘Islamic
public reason.’ This discussion ought to be viewed as part of an effort to
discover a common language in terms of which Islamic and democratic dis-
courses can be seen to be mutually intelligible, or at least not completely
‘incommensurable.’ This is a complex undertaking that entails discussing ques-
tions about constitutionalism (rule of law), civil society, popular sovereignty,
secularism, freedom and equality. These (difficult) questions cannot be discussed
simultaneously in a brief space. Therefore, I shall allude to them only insofar as
they concern the relation between democracy and public reason.
Public Reason and Democracy
Most social scientists agree that politics is a public matter, in the sense that the
issues that call for political decision are typically matters of public concern. This
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applies also to the method that is used to arrive at political decisions. At least
in theory, democracy describes the political behavior of free and equal individ-
uals. Such individuals presumably will have a strong interest in both the
substance and method of the decisions that can affect their well-being.1
Voting, referenda, and majority rule constitute important elements of the
process of democratic decision making. But alongside these, democratic theory
and practice always have included a space for discussion and debate at both
public and government levels. According to some thinkers, it is precisely this,
rather than majority rule as such, that makes democracy attractive. Thus,
according to John Dewey:
Majority rule, just as majority rule, is as foolish as its critics charge it with being. But
it never is merely majority rule. … The means by which a majority comes to be a
majority is the more important thing: antecedent debates, modification of views to meet
the opinions of minorities. … The essential need, in other words, is the improvement of
the methods and conditions of debate, discussion and persuasion.2
But how should public issues be discussed? What rules should be adhered to
in the discussion? In recent years, Rawls has emerged as one of the strongest and
best-known advocates of the view that we must not base our contribution to
public discussion on our special ‘comprehensive’ (religious or philosophical)
doctrines. Our contribution should be guided by what he calls ‘the ideal of public
reason,’ which is
[T]he ideal that citizens are to conduct their public political discussions of constitutional
essentials and matters of basic justice within the framework of what each sincerely
regards as a reasonable political conception of justice, a conception that expresses
political values that others as free and equal also might reasonably be expected
reasonably to endorse.3
This conception of reason must be distinguished from mere intelligence, the
capacity to acquire and use knowledge of causes and means needed for
achieving predetermined goals (or ‘means–ends rationality’). A capacity of the
latter sort can be found in the psychopath, but such an individual would not
count as a reasonable person, nor would his thinking follow the rules of public
reason, in Rawls’s sense.
Far from being purely instrumental and without content, public reason,
according to Rawls, is based on a concept of political justice that is ‘broadly
liberal in character’:
The content [of public reason] is formulated by a political conception of justice,
which … is liberal in character. … [I]t specifies certain basic rights, liberties, and oppor-
tunities; … it assigns a special priority to these rights, liberties, and opportunities;
1 For a discussion of the public and private aspects of politics, see Jon Elster, ‘The Market and the Forum: Three
Varieties of Political Theory,’ in James Bohman and William Rehg, eds., Deliberative Democracy: Essays on
Reason and Politics (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997), pp. 3–33.
2 John Dewey, The Public and its Problems, cited in Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms (Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press), p. 304.
3 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), p. l.
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and … it affirms measures assuring all citizens adequate all-purpose means to make
effective use of their basic liberties and opportunities.4
But this is not the whole picture. As citizens engage in argument and
justification, they follow ‘guidelines of inquiry that specify ways of reasoning
and criteria for the kinds of information relevant for political questions.’ To be
more specific,
[W]e are to appeal only to presently accepted general beliefs and forms of reasoning
found in common sense, and the methods of conclusions of science when these are not
controversial. … We are not to appeal to comprehensive religious and philosophical
doctrines, … nor to elaborate economic theories of general equilibrium, say, if these are
in dispute. As far as possible, the knowledge and ways of reasoning that ground our
affirming the principles of justice … are to rest on the plain truths now widely accepted,
or available, to citizens generally. Otherwise the political conception would not provide
a public basis of justification.5
In addition to public reason thus explained, Rawls recognizes the existence of
‘nonpublic’ reasons—‘the reasons of churches and universities and other associ-
ations in civil society.’6 Since an understanding of the contrast between public
and non-public reason will shed light on both, let us ask what is meant by ‘the
reason of churches.’ This hopefully will take us a step toward an understanding
of ‘religious reason.’
A first approximation to the answer can be reached by following Robert
Audi’s definition of ‘secular reason’ as:
one whose normative force, i.e., its status as a prima facie justificatory element, does not
evidentially depend on the existence of God (or denying it) or on theological consider-
ations, or on the pronouncements of a person or institution qua religious authority.7
Clearly, Audi is not using ‘reason’ in the sense of a capacity to think within a
certain framework of categories and guidelines, which is what Rawls’s usage
requires. Rather, Audi’s reason is simply a consideration, a ‘reason-why,’
perhaps even a whole argument in support of a certain claim.
We can build on what Rawls and Audi say in order to define what we
mean by ‘religious reason.’ In common with other types of reason, religious
reason does (or ideally can) accept principles of logic, mathematics, non-
controversial science, and common-sense knowledge. However, it is dis-
tinguished from other types of reason in that it involves belief in the divine, the
affirmation of theological propositions, or the pronouncements of persons and
4 Ibid., p. 223.
5 Ibid., pp. 224–225. Rawls also recognizes a wide notion of public reason according to which non-public reasons
may be introduced as additional support for public reasons. Ideally speaking, however, public reasons ought to
be sufficient for purposes of justification. For a discussion of the notion of wide (or inclusive) public reason, see
David Reidy, ‘Rawls’ Wide View of Public Reason: Not Wide Enough,’ Res Publica, 6 (2000): 49–72; and
Lawrence B. Solum, ‘Inclusive Public Reason,’ Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 75 (1994): 217–31.
6 Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 213.
7 Robert Audi, ‘Liberal Democracy and the Place of Religion in Politics,’ in Robert Audi and Nicholas
Wolterstorff, eds., Religion in the Public Square: The Place of Religious Convictions in Political Debate (Lanham,
MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997), p. 26.
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institutions qua religious authority. It also includes values, conceptions of good,
rights, and duties ordered in a certain way. In principle, religious reason should
be thought of as having ‘content,’ albeit one that is different from the liberal
content in Rawls’s public reason.
Meanings of ‘Reason’ in Islamic Discourses
It is possible to distinguish a number of meanings of ‘reason,’ as the term is used
in contemporary Islamic discourses. Some meanings do not have any direct or
obvious relevance to politics, and thus may be set aside. They include Moham-
mad al-Jabiri’s use of ‘reason’ to mean (culture-specific) epistemological presup-
positions.8 The same applies to the use of ‘reason’ to mean ‘philosophy of
rationalism,’ which implies belief in the possibility of objective knowledge9 and
the intelligibility of the world as a whole.10 Finally, one can mention the use of
‘reason’ to refer to ‘instrumental rationality’—the ability to find means for
achieving prescribed ends.11
However, contemporary Islamic discourses know other concepts of reason that
have political implications and thus are relevant to discussing Rawls’s public
reason. This applies to at least two concepts that some writers have begun to
discuss. The first of these addresses concerns that have moved Western thinkers
to speak of ‘discourse ethics.’ In al-Bahth ‘an al-’Aql (In search of reason),
Mohammad Farhat distinguishes between ‘polemics’ and ‘genuine dialogue,’
saying that the latter presupposes a readiness to accept an opponent’s view if it
proves to be true.12 To improve the quality of dialogue, Farhat suggests the use
of clear definitions and calls for controlling emotions that can be aroused by
discussion of sensitive issues such as religion.13
Another writer, Abdel-Qadir al-Shaikhaly, has a more elaborate view of the
rules that ought to govern debate. In his Akhlaqiyyat al-hiwar (Ethics of debate),
he discusses the formal requirements that must be met in order for dialogue to
be fruitful. These include ‘good conversational manners,’ such as listening
attentively to one’s opponent, and avoidance of anger and personal attacks. More
importantly, the manners include having an attitude of respect toward the other
person, a measure of healthy skepticism concerning the truth, and readiness to
support a position with reasons and arguments.14 Al-Shaikhaly is aware that civil
public debates are taking place all the time in democratic countries and that such
8 Mohammad al-Jabiri, Takwin al-‘qal al-‘Arabi [The constitution of the Arab mind] (Beirut: Markaz Dirasat
al-Wihdah, 1991), p. 15.
9 Burhan Ghallion, ‘Al-‘Aqlaniyyah wa Naqd al-‘Aql’ [Rationalism and the critique of reason’], al-Wihdah
(1988): 93–94.
10 Mohammad Jassous, ‘Jadaliyyat al-‘Aql wa al-‘Aqlaniyyah’ [Dialectic of reason and rationality], al-Wihdah
(1988): 32.
11 Ibid., p. 39; cf. Ghallion, ‘Al-’Aqlaniyya,’ p. 104; and al-Jabiri, Takwin, p. 24.
12 Mohammad Farhat, Al-Bahth ‘an al-‘Aql [In search of reason] (Cairo: Dar al-Hilal, 1997), p. 7.
13 Ibid., p. 8.
14 Abdel-Qadir al-Shaikhaly, Akhlaqiyat al-hiwar (Ethics of Debate) (Amman: Dar al-Shorouq, 1993), pp. 16, 22,
43.
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debates contribute to the vitality of political life in a democracy. He is convinced
of the need for something similar to happen in Islamic countries.15 However, he
does not go into the details of the hoped-for political order, nor does he discuss
the types of justifications (religious or non-religious) that may be used legiti-
mately in public debates.
The second concept of reason that has become an object of much discussion
is ‘Islamic reason.’ This is, of course, a type of religious reason. Several writers
have commented critically on this type of rationality. For example, ‘religious
rationality’ (al-’aqlaniyah al-diniyyah) is the term that the well-known Arab
sociologist Halim Barakat uses to refer to the rationality of the various Islamic
‘religious sciences,’ e.g., Qur’anic exegesis and jurisprudence. According to
Barakat, Islamic religious rationality is based on traditional faith and the use
of logical and legal methods such as precedent and reasoning by analogy
(al-qiyas).16 Clearly, this type of reasoning need not be restricted to the religious
sciences. Religious-minded thinkers do not necessarily change their methods of
reasoning when they discuss political and other public matters.
Another writer with a clear conception of the ‘Islamic method of reasoning’
is Nasr Hamid Abu-Zayd. His Naqd al-Khitab al-Diniy (Critique of religious
discourse) offers an analysis of the principles that govern Islamic discourse,
including one principle that he contentiously calls ‘reduction of all phenomena
to one source.’17 Not surprisingly, the author finds Islamic reason narrow,
intolerant, and reductionist.
Munir Shafiq probably has provided the clearest and most relevant conceptu-
alization of ‘Islamic reason.’ Struggling with skepticism and anxious to over-
come a supposed dichotomy between reason and faith, Shafiq argues that there
is no single ‘reason’ that either can support or oppose faith:
We must once and for all put an end to the fallacy which is implicit in the questions of
‘What is compatible with reason? What is compatible with faith?’ For the correct
approach is to ask ‘What is compatible with reason which is based on Islam, as opposed
to reason which is based on other faiths?’ The conflict is not between reason and
irrationality. Rather, it is between categories which are championed by different minds.18
Shafiq’s meaning is clear, but it would be even clearer if his last sentence were
to be understood as meaning that the conflict is between different rationalities,
or types of reason, that are espoused by different people. In any case, the crucial
term here is ‘reason which is based on Islam,’ or ‘Islamic reason.’
Islamic reason does not differ generically from other types of reason. It does,
however, incorporate distinctive beliefs in the areas of metaphysics, religion, and
morality. In other words, reason that is based on Islam has ‘content,’ and it
15 Ibid., pp. 90–91.
16 Halim Barakat, ‘Al-‘Aqlaniyah wa al-Mukhailah fi al-thaqafah al-‘Arabiyyah’ [Rationality and imagination in
Arab culture], al-Wihdah (1988): 51.
17 Nasr Hamid Abu-Zayd, Naqd al-Khitab al-Diniy [Critique of religious discourse] (Cairo: Sina lil-Nashr, 1994),
p. 67.
18 Munir Shafiq, Islam in the Struggle for Civilization (Tunis: Dar al-Buraq, 1991), p. 138, emphasis added.
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should be thought of in general terms by analogy to ‘reason that is based on a
liberal political conception of justice.’ In both cases there are principles and
values that constitute the ground rules for the discussion of public matters. What
these matters are and whether they are ‘off-limits’ to public discussion are
questions whose answers depend on one’s interpretation of the shari’a. We do
not need to resolve these questions in order to see the prima facie intelligibility
of the notion of Islamic reason.19
In concrete terms, what does it mean to use Islamic reason to think about
public matters? In recent years, Islamic approaches and methods of analysis have
proliferated to such an extent among the educated, or ‘arguing’ groups, within
Muslim societies that it could be said that Islamic reason rapidly is becoming the
dominant mode of thinking about public matters. Hence it may not seem difficult
to provide examples of such use. However, this Islamic public argument is not
taking place in stable, well-established Islamic polities, with society-wide
intellectual traditions and unquestioned legitimacy. Thus, it may prove difficult
to find realistic examples of the operation of ‘Islamic reason.’ Still, one or two
examples come to mind.
The first example is a form of public criticism that Talal Asad has discussed
in connection with the (Islamic?) regime of Saudi Arabia. Nasiha, or ‘morally
corrective criticism,’ is addressed to rulers or to society at large, and often is
delivered publicly during Friday sermons or by means of theological lectures
that are circulated widely among the reading and viewing publics. According to
Asad, nasiha is a form of ‘reasoned criticism,’ and the authority with which the
nasiha-givers (the ‘ulema) speak is subject to ‘conceptual and institutional
conditions that must be attended to if discourses are to be persuasive.’20
In one respect, the practice of nasiha resembles what Kant calls ‘the public
use of reason.’ To those who practice it, nasiha does not express private opinion
or private taste. It is more like the use that anyone may make of his reason ‘as
a man of learning addressing the entire reading public.’21 Yet in another respect
nasiha is not egalitarian, for it implies that the ruler or other persons at the
receiving end of the nasiha are not the moral equals of the nasiha-giver.
According to Asad,
nasiha … stand[s] in a conceptual world quite unlike that of the Enlightenment.
For unlike the former, the latter world is inhabited by individuals aspiring to self-
determination and dispassionate judgment, whose moral foundation is universal reason,
not disciplined virtues.22
19 A useful classification of the different approaches to shari’a, with illustrative examples drawn from the works
of several Islamic scholars, can be found in Charles Kurzman, ed., Liberal Islam: A Sourcebook (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1998), pp. 14–17.
20 Talal Asad, ‘The Limits of Religious Criticism in the Middle East: Notes on Islamic Public Argument,’ in idem,
Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1993), p. 210. Part of what the author means to refer to is the ‘Islamic content’ of the nasiha;
but this is not to be taken as objection, inasmuch as a corresponding ‘ideological’ content can be attributed to
reasoning that takes place within the confines of the modern liberal tradition (see ibid., p. 236).
21 Kant, Political Writings, ed. Hans Reiss (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), p. 55.
22 Asad, ‘The Limits of Religious Criticism in the Middle East: Notes on Islamic Public Argument,’ pp. 219–20.
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Still, it may be argued that this inegalitarianism is not a consequence of the
Islamic faith as such, but is a product of Islamic history and the activities of the
politically ambitious ‘ulema. One certainly can imagine a more enlightened and
egalitarian Islamic polity where freedom of thought and expression allows
nasiha to be both universal and mutual, instead of being a privilege of a specific
class of people with a monopoly of religious knowledge.
Perhaps certain aspects of this imagined ideal eventually will be realized in
the Islamic Republic of Iran. Of course, few, if any, people believe that
contemporary Iran is an ideal Islamic polity, but it is probably the only regime
with serious Islamic credentials that has managed to sustain continued disagree-
ments and debates among people who profess to stand on Islamic grounds.
Public matters are discussed and disagreements are found among different
parties, but all this takes place within a broad consensus on the need and
necessity for an Islamic regime.
In such a society, public reasoning does take place, and people are expected
to offer arguments for their positions. Many of these arguments will not differ
from those found in other, non-Islamic societies.23 But there will be differences,
connected to the use of ‘religious reason’: Periodically, we shall come across an
argument whose major premise is a Qur’anic verse, a tradition of the Prophet,
or something that has uncontested religious authority. Parties to a debate will not
reject the use of such premises. Rather, they will attack other parts in the
argument, or they will seek to disarm the troublesome premise by offering a
reinterpretation that will render it irrelevant to the conclusion.
To reiterate: Reasoning does take place here, and it takes place in public.24 But
is this a case of public reasoning? Certainly it is not in Rawls’s sense of the
term. We may ask ‘why not’? Is the meaning that Rawls attaches to public
reason the only legitimate one? Does public reason have to be secular? These
questions bring us face to face with the challenges that public reason (in Rawls’s
sense) encounters in Islamic societies, where religious reason is well entrenched.
Community, Diversity, and Public Reason
According to Rawls, one of the most important questions that political theory
should seek to answer is:
How is it possible that there may exist over time a stable and just society of free and
equal citizens profoundly divided by reasonable though incompatible religious, philo-
sophical, and moral doctrines?25
23 Universal human needs and possibilities will dictate certain propositions for all societies, just as they will exclude
others.
24 Many complex questions remain to be discussed in connection with the relations between civil society, the public
sphere, the state, and society in general. For a discussion of ‘Islamic public spheres,’ see Dale Eickelman and
A. Salvatore, ‘The Public Spheres and Muslim Identities,’ European Journal of Sociology, XLIII (2002): 92–115;
for a discussion of different views on the relation between democracy, the Islamic state, and society, see Yahya
Sadowski, ‘The New Orientalism and the Democracy Debate,’ in Joel Beinin and Joe Stork, eds., Political Islam:
Essays from Middle East Report (London: I. B. Tauris, 1997).
25 Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. xx.
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Rawls takes his theory of political liberalism to provide an answer to this
question. In this he does not differ from other thinkers who view liberalism as
a solution to the problem of government amid diversity. Thus Wolterstorff says:
Liberal democracy is in good measure a mode of governance relevant to those societies
in which different religions are represented, and not only different religions, but different
comprehensive perspectives on reality, the good life, and human destiny.26
This characterization of liberalism does not explain why we need to develop
a conception of public reason that is based on a liberal political conception of
justice. The bridge to such a conception is established partly through what Rawls
calls ‘the liberal principle of legitimacy.’ According to this principle:
[O]ur exercise of political power is proper and hence justifiable only when it is exercised
in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens may reasonably be
expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to them as reasonable
and rational.27
Why would it be wrong to exercise political power over people in accordance
with rules and constitutions which they do not understand, or which they
understand, but deeply disagree with? According to Charles Larmore, ‘we shall
be treating persons merely as means, as objects of coercion, and not also as ends,
engaging in directly their distinctive capacities as persons.’28 Thus, it appears
that the ultimate reason that lies behind the liberal principle of legitimacy is the
principle of respect for persons.29
The same notion of ‘respect for persons’ underlies ‘the duty of civility,’ which
enjoins citizens to ‘explain to one another on those fundamental questions how
the principles and policies they advocate and vote for can be supported by the
political values of public reason.’30 This brings us close to forming a conception
of public reason in accordance with Rawls’s criteria. For the use of reasons that
others (can) understand leads to the notion of reason being ‘public’ in the sense
of not presupposing unfamiliar or controversial methods and doctrines. Given
that ‘religious reasons’ are almost invariably controversial and non-universal,
they are immediately driven out from the public arena. They are not fit material
for public reasoning.31
26 Nicholas Wolterstorff, ‘The Role of Religion in Decision and Discussion of Political Issues,’ in Audi and
Wolterstorff, eds., Religion in the Public Square: The Place of Religious Convictions in Political Debate, p. 69;
cf. Audi, ‘Liberal Democracy,’ p. 16.
27 Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 217.
28 Charles Larmore, ‘The Moral Basis of Political Liberalism,’ Journal of Philosophy, XCVI (1999): 607; cf. Jean
Hampton, ‘The Common Faith of Liberalism,’ Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 75 (1994): 194.
29 Larmore, ‘The Moral Basis of Liberalism,’ p. 607.
30 Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 217.
31 According to Onora O’Neill, ‘A communication that presupposes some authority other than that of reason may
fail to communicate with those who are not subject to that authority; they can interpret it, if at all, only on the
hypothesis of some claim that they reject.’ See Onora O’Neill, ‘The Public Use of Reason,’ in The Constructions
of Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 34.
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From an Islamic point of view (shared by many non-Islamists as well), this
method of justifying public reason has one serious limitation. It is based on the
supposition of doctrinal diversity, the irreducible plurality of comprehensive
doctrines in society. But what if there is a society that is more or less doctrinally
homogeneous, united by belief in a certain religion? Here, one no longer would
need to worry about communication failures if religious reason were to be
allowed to work in the public sphere. Nor would one need to worry about acting
disrespectfully toward fellow citizens, because religious reasons would be
common currency in this type of society.
Many Islamic thinkers are attracted to this line of argument, for they tend to
believe that Islamic peoples, commonly taken to constitute one umma (nation),
have the same conceptions of justice and goodness. Hence they expect Islamic
political life to be less adversarial and more consensual than in other communi-
ties. Of course, this is by no means obvious. Attention may be drawn to the
various schools of thought that have flourished since the beginning of the
Arab Renaissance in the second half of the nineteenth century. These schools
included Islamism, secular nationalism, socialism, liberalism, communism and
pan-Arabism. It is true that many of these ideologies have lost much ground to
Islamism, which has become the dominant mode of thought in recent years.
However, it is always possible that a situation of diversity may arise again.
Be that as it may, it is not clear that the attempt to base (Rawlsian) public
reason on the assumption of doctrinal diversity can yield definitive results. For
Islamic thinkers may be able to admit the existence of a certain measure of
doctrinal diversity in contemporary Islamic societies and still make a case for
Islamic reason. Their argument can take the following form. All societies, past
and present, have known doctrinal diversity. The question is never whether
doctrinal diversity exists, but whether it is wide enough to rule out the possibility
of political community. Now, in order for people to be able to live together as
one political community, they must agree on some basic things. They cannot
disagree over the most important issues and principles of social-political life and
continue to exist for long as one political community. Therefore the pluralism
and doctrinal diversity (of which Rawls and other liberal thinkers speak) must
be limited by general agreement on fundamental matters. What these fundamen-
tals are (whether they are liberal or Islamic, secular or religious) will differ from
one society to another. They cannot be decided a priori by philosophers. In the
end it is people themselves who must choose their own constitution.
This limitation on doctrinal diversity applies to all political communities,
including those best suited to the application of Rawls’s notion of public reason.
Some commentators have recognized this point; for example, according to
Wolterstorff:
What is striking about our contemporary proponents of the liberal position is that they
are still looking for a politics that is the politics of community with shared perspective.
They see that perspective cannot, in our societies, be a comprehensive perspective … So
they propose scaling down our expectations. Take a society that is more less a liberal
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democracy, and then consider a single aspect of that society, a single dimension: the
political.32
Indeed, how else is one to think of Rawls’s idea that
[C]itizens who affirm reasonable but opposing comprehensive doctrines belong to an
overlapping consensus: that is, they generally endorse that conception of justice as giving
the content of their political judgments on basic institutions. … In such a consensus, the
reasonable doctrines endorse the political conception, each from its own point of view.33
Aren’t people who endorse the same political conception of justice a ‘com-
munity’ of sorts (a community with ‘shared perspective’)? This concept of
community may not be robust enough to satisfy communitarians, but it is
probably ‘thicker’ than the concept that Wolterstorff thinks is sufficient for
politics. Onora O’Neill also has dwelled on ‘communal’ aspects of Rawls’s
theory, claiming that
In assuming an idealized, closed society … as the context of political justification, Rawls
takes it that the public who are the proper audience for one another’s attempts at
justification consists of fellow citizens, among whom there is in effect prior understand-
ing that they form a ‘people.’34
Community being unavoidable, the question that remains is what sort of
community is it, or how is it constituted ideologically? For instance, will an
Islamic society opt for a liberal political conception of justice and the notion of
public reason on which it is based? Or will it opt for an Islamic conception of
justice and the Islamic reason on which it is based?
The argument that the former path should be taken on account of doctrinal
diversity has to meet two challenges. Firstly, advocates of liberal public reason
have to show that doctrinal diversity exists to a politically relevant degree.
Secondly, they have to explain why the political community formed out of the
doctrinal diversity has to follow a liberal political conception of justice, rather
than an Islamic or some other conception. Is the liberal conception preferable to
other candidates because of its neutrality? Or is it preferable because all
(‘reasonable’) comprehensive doctrines are able to accept it, ‘each from its point
of view,’ as Rawls claims?
The Dogmatic Aspect of Public Reason
Debates that are taking place in the West between communitarian and liberal
proponents of democracy have yet to make an impact on Islamic thinkers who
continue to think of democracy mainly in liberal versus socialist terms. Never-
theless, there are two reasons for making reference to the debate between liberals
and communitarians here. Firstly, the debate is relevant to the critique of the
32 Wolterstorff, ‘The Role of Religion,’ p. 109 (emphasis added).
33 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 39, pp. 39, 134.
34 Onora O’Neill, ‘Political Liberalism and Public Reason: A Critical Notice of John Rawls, Political Liberalism,’
Philosophical Review, 106 (1997): 419.
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Rawlsian conception of public reason and the liberal conception of justice on
which it is based. Secondly, and more importantly, some of the Islamic
objections to the notion of public reason are formulated best in communitarian
terms.
According to Hillary Aronovitch, the philosophical core of communitarianism
consists of these two ideas: firstly, the notion of the encumbered (socially
situated) self, whose sense of identity is bound up with certain values, beliefs
and practices; and, secondly, the priority of the idea of good to the idea of
rights.35 There is much here with which Islamic thinkers can agree, which can
be used to criticize some of the presuppositions of the notion of public reason,
as understood by Rawls.36
Let us first take up the matter of the ‘encumbered self’ in relation to public
reason. According to this conception, public reason is the language of communi-
cation that citizens use to address each other as free and equal persons, without
reference to moral, philosophical, or religious beliefs. This is how citizens
appear in public. This is their public identity, so to speak. But over and above
their public identity citizens are allowed to have a non-public identity that Rawls
describes in these terms:
It is essential to stress that citizens in their personal affairs, or in the internal life of
associations to which they belong, may regard their final ends and attachments in a way
very different from the way the political conception involves. … They may regard it
simply unthinkable to view themselves apart from certain religious, philosophical and
moral convictions, or from certain enduring attachments and loyalties. These convictions
and attachments are part of what we may call their ‘nonpublic identity.’37
In other words, one is allowed to have two identities. Qua political person, one
is obliged to reason in accordance with the precepts of public reason, to have a
‘highest-order interest’ in the capacity for autonomy; qua private citizen one is
allowed to be, say, a believer who uses religious, rather than public, reason in
his dealings with the world.
Islamic thinkers reject the prospect of viewing persons as either ‘private
citizens’ or ‘political citizens.’ To them, the correct classification is one that
distinguishes between believers and non-believers. Religious belief is politically
relevant. Not only that, but it also plays an integrative function that resists all
attempts to turn religion into a private matter. To get an idea about how
35 Hillary Aronovitch, ‘From Communitarianism to Republicanism: On Sandal and His Critics,’ Canadian Journal
of Philosophy, 30 (2000): 621.
36 Fred Halliday states in ‘Relativism and Universalism in Human Rights: The Case of the Islamic Middle East,’
in Politics and Human Rights, ed. David Beetham (London: Blackwell, 1987), p. 155, that it is a simplification
to compare the Islamic position in the human rights debate to the communitarian views encountered in Western
thought. However, it is not obvious that the comparison is altogether misguided. Religious communities
experienced the priority of the good to the right, and their members lived as ‘encumbered selves’ long before they
could describe their experiences in these terms. Quite to the contrary, it could be said that modern communitarian
conceptions, including some that are secular, derive their inspiration from visions that religious communities
sought to realize.
37 John Rawls, ‘Justice as Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical,’ Philosophy and Public Affairs, 14 (1985): 241.
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‘encumbered’ is the Islamic self, consider what al-Mawdudi, a well-respected
modern Islamic thinker, says about the role that shari’a plays in the life of the
Muslim individual:
[Shari’a] judgments of good and evil extend to all parts of our lives. They cover religious
acts and duties, as well as actions undertaken by individuals that reflect on their way of
life, morals, customs, manners of eating, drinking, attire, speech, and family affairs. They
cover social relationships, financial, economic and administrative matters, rights and
duties of citizenship, organs of government, war and peace, and relations with foreign
powers … There is no part of our lives where the shari’a does not distinguish between
good and evil.38
In Rawls’s system, believers are expected to bracket religious teachings and
injunctions when they step into the public arena. They are to act as if religion
does not matter to the way one relates to other citizens. But what kind of self
is that which self-consistently can switch between two identities—at one
moment thinking that religious beliefs and values are the most important things
in life, the next moment acting as if they did not matter?
Like other Western thinkers who have criticized this part of Rawls’s theory,
Islamic thinkers are likely to follow Will Kymlicka in wondering about the
coherence of this position:
The problem is to explain why anyone would accept the ideal of autonomy in political
contexts without also accepting it more generally. If the members of a religious
community see their religious ends as constitutive, so that they have no ability to stand
back and assess these ends, why would they accept a political conception of the person
that assumes that they do have that ability (and indeed a highest-order interest in
exercising that ability)?39
Rawls’s conception of the place and function of religious identity is not the only
objectionable part of his theory. Many Islamic thinkers also will have problems
with his claim of the priority of the idea of right over good. This is another side
of the individualist-contractarian spirit that animates Rawls’s political liberalism
and its associated concept of public reason. Both can be seen at work in the
notion of the ‘original position.’
As it is commonly explained, Rawls’s ‘original position’ is a method of
reasoning about the ideas of equality, freedom, and autonomy in an imaginary
setting where individuals are denied all knowledge that might prejudice their
conclusions about rights and obligations. Reasoning about rights in the original
position leads to the two well-known principles of justice: the principle that
gives each person equal basic liberty consistent with equal basic liberty to all;
and the difference principle which ensures that each citizen has the material
38 Mawdudi, Al-Qanun al-Islami wa Turuq Tanfithih [Islamic law and methods of its application] (n.p.: Mu’assasat
al-Risalah, 1975), p. 24.
39 Will Kymlicka, ‘Two Models of Pluralism and Tolerance,’ in Toleration: An Elusive Virtue, ed. David Heyd
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), p. 91.
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means necessary for exercising his or her basic liberty. These two principles
shape the ‘content’ of public reason.40
But what does the priority of right to the good amount to? This is explained
by reference to the above-mentioned two principles. According to Rawls:
In justice as fairness the priority of right means that the principles of political justice
impose limits on permissible ways of life; and hence the claims citizens make to pursue
ends that transgress those limits have no weight.41
The idea is that free and equal individuals may have different views about the
good (life). Individuals have a right to pursue their own conception of the good
to the extent that their ‘way of life’ does not threaten the right that other
individuals have to pursue their own possibly different ends. Rights are ‘fixed,’
as it were, and they cannot be overturned in the name of any good. Political
society is thus conceived of as a contractual association of separate, autonomous
individuals who stand on their rights, and who are united mainly by their belief
in the desirability of living as separate, autonomous individuals.
Islamic thinkers respond to this vision in two ways. Firstly, they offer a vision
of society that does not consist of separate, free individuals who have a highest
interest in autonomy. Society is conceived of as a large, integrated project the
purpose of which is to realize a supreme human good, which is for the individual
to stand in the right relationship to God. To stand too much on one’s rights and
to insist too much on one’s autonomy and freedom are taken as signs of putting
the self (instead of God) at the center of one’s life. In the Islamic vision there
is no room for autonomous, free individuals to ‘negotiate’ a social-political
scheme that is designed to preserve their freedom and autonomy to the greatest
possible extent. Rather, there is a division of labor, an assignment of roles with
different rights and duties that may not be equal but which nevertheless are
accepted as the right moral scheme.
Aside from this, Islamic thinkers can claim that liberalism does not really
succeed in putting the notion of the good in second place, despite its claim to
the contrary. This can be seen when we consider the rights and liberties that are
enshrined in Rawls’s first principle of justice, which says:
Each person has an equal claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic rights and
liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme for all; and in this scheme
the equal political liberties, and only those liberties, are to be guaranteed their fair
value.42
It is interesting to observe that only political rights and liberties are guaranteed
their fair value. These are the rights that protect, nurture, or otherwise help
realize the ideal of the human individual as free, autonomous, and equal. But if
40 Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 223.
41 Ibid., p. 174.
42 Ibid., p. 5.
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it were not good for humans to be free, autonomous and equal, what significance
would these rights have? As Aronovitch says:
liberalism is … committed to a good as the basis of its rights and the notion of justice,
but this good is that of a certain conception of personal development, a certain sense of
the self.43
This is presumably the self that is free, autonomous, and able to revise its values
and commitments without loss of identity. This is certainly an ideal that many
people find attractive, especially those who are skeptical of finding ‘the truth’ in
moral and political matters. Without this ideal, the liberal scheme of rights
would lose its purpose and meaning.
In this light, liberalism is seen to hide a specific conception of the good, one
that belies its claim of neutrality between different conceptions of the good. In
fact, one author has gone so far as to argue that Rawls’s political liberalism
differs very little from other traditional, supposedly ‘sectarian’ varieties of
liberalism, which Rawls is anxious to avoid.44
Rawls’s public reason can be seen to favor a certain conception of the self
(autonomous, free, and unencumbered) and a certain conception of the good (the
good of being a free, autonomous, and unencumbered self). The rules of
reasoning, and the premises from which one is allowed to reason, are designed
to support these conceptions. In view of these considerations, it may be better
to refer to Rawls’s public reason as liberal public reason, which is indeed how
some authors refer to it.45 For Rawls to speak of ‘public reason,’ pure and
simple, is presumptuous, because it implies that only by being based on
(political) liberalism can reason be public.46
Conclusion: Islam, Public Reason, and Democracy
To Islamic writers the most debatable aspect of public reason is its content. If
it is stipulated initially that public reason means reasoning on the basis of a
liberal political conception of justice, then Islamic thought easily proves to be
antithetical to public reasoning. By Rawls’s definition, Islam is a comprehensive
doctrine, which means it cannot serve as a ground for public reasoning. But
stipulative definitions are not to the point here, nor do they prove anything. As
it is, the notion of public reason does not seem to have been caught in the
clutches of any stipulative definitions so far. The fact that some authors are
willing to speak of ‘liberal public reason’ shows that we are not dealing with a
tautology.
43 Aronovitch, p. 635.
44 Hampton, p. 187.
45 Reidy, p. 52; Andrew Williams, ‘The Alleged Incompleteness of Public Reason,’ Res Publica, 6 (2000): 207.
46 Consider what James Bohman says about this ‘assumption of singularity’: ‘If a society is diverse and divided,
there is no one “public sphere,” no one public, but instead a plurality of them: the publics of different sub-groups,
cultures, or experts.’ (Bohman, ‘Public Reason and Cultural Pluralism: Political Liberalism and the Problem of
Moral Conflict,’ Political Theory, 23 (1995): 260.) A pluralism of ‘public reasons’ is not a less plausible notion
than a plurality of publics.
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To all appearances, the meaning and role of ‘public reason’ can be contested
by different theories about the nature of reasoning as well as ‘publicness.’ To
Larmore, the term ‘reasonable’ means ‘the free and open exercise of the basic
capacities of reason.’47 This does not imply the restrictions that Rawls uses to
exclude reasoning from religious premises. Similarly, the concept of what is
public is defined differently in different societies and cultures. Modern and
traditional (secularized and religious) societies have defined the boundaries
differently, and probably will continue to do so.
Putting all of these ideas together yields the conclusion that is not out of the
question for non-secular views, such as Islam, to lay claim to a concept of public
reason. Of course, this will be an Islam-based public reason, in analogy to
Rawls’s liberalism-based public reason. In Rawls’s case, the ideal of public
reason is a reflection of certain aspects of democratic practice in contemporary
Western liberal democracies. Such practice is characterized by (a certain mea-
sure of) openness, freedom, pluralism, and secularism. Thus, a question naturally
will arise as to whether ‘Islamic public reason’ can be said to be compatible with
democracy. Certainly, it cannot be said to be compatible with liberal democratic
practice. But, as was the case with the notion of public reason, Islamic thinkers
will want to ask whether liberal democratic practice is the only legitimate
interpretation of democracy.
Several writers, Islamic and non-Islamic, have argued for the somewhat
unusual (but not obviously incoherent) view that a society where religion is
practiced as a public matter can be democratic. Thus, Joseph Schumpeter argues
that ‘Religious fervor … is certainly compatible with democracy however we
define the latter.’ According to him, we have to let every populus define itself
in whatever manner it chooses.48 On this account, religious self-definition is
certainly possible, and thus religion may come to be practiced as a public matter
(if the populus so wishes). More modestly, other writers have sought to argue
that, conceptually, democracy does not imply secularism, and that, despite
appearances to the contrary, popular sovereignty and divine sovereignty are not
mutually exclusive.49 Still others have sought to uncover democratic elements
within Islamic thought and history.50
Criticism of Islamic norms with respect to equality, toleration, pluralism, and
freedom of thought are all too familiar. Some, perhaps all, of these matters are
relevant to the meaning (and exercise) of public reason. Thus, if women and
non-Muslims are not treated as equal citizens in the Islamic polity, serious
questions will arise as to the meaning of ‘public,’ which will be reduced to the
‘male Muslim public,’ as opposed to ‘public’ pure and simple. Similarly, it can
47 Larmore, ‘The Moral Basis,’ p. 602.
48 Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (New York: Harper & Row, 1976), p. 245.
49 Raja Bahlul, ‘People vs. God: The Logic of “Divine Sovereignty” in Islamic Democratic Discourse,’ Islam and
Muslim-Christian Relations, 11 (2000): 287–98.
50 John Esposito and John Voll, Islam and Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).
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be argued that toleration and freedom of thought are necessary to the proper
exercise of the reasoning faculty.51
These are difficult questions, and more work needs to be done by Islamic
thinkers on these and other issues before it can be said that Islamic thought has
reached a satisfactory settlement with democracy. In this connection one should
mention the daring interpretations of Islamic law (shari’a) that have been
presented by innovative Islamic thinkers in the areas of human rights52 and the
epistemology of religious knowledge.53
It must also be remembered that questions of toleration, pluralism, and
freedom of thought and expression are not problematic solely in Islamic
political-cultural settings. They continue to constitute a problem for liberal
government as well. For example, in one rather revealing passage, Rawls
acknowledges the possibility that society may contain unreasonable, irrational,
even ‘mad’ comprehensive doctrines (in addition to the ‘reasonable’ doctrines
that accept ‘the essentials of a democratic regime’). What is to be done about
such doctrines? Rawls’s uncompromising answer is that ‘[in] their case the
problem is to contain them so that they do not undermine the unity and justice
of society.’54 However, ‘containment’ is different from toleration. It implies
active resistance, if not outright hostility.
Of course, advocates of religious government will be gratified to hear liberals
acknowledge that tolerance has limits. Clearly, the differences between liberal
and religious rule will focus on the kinds of things to be tolerated, and the extent
to which they are tolerated. Without belittling the importance of differences
between different political systems, it must be admitted in the end that there are
few truths in this area that have been accepted by all societies and all cultures.
Thus, for example, one can expect to find differences between liberal and
Islamic regimes when it comes to the toleration of ‘first trimester abortions.’
Such differences need not impugn the claims of either to democracy and
‘reasonableness.’ All they show is that ideas of what is reasonable differ
from one society to another. They may even differ within one society, as
evidenced by some of the criticism leveled at Rawls’s (implied) claim that the
anti-abortionist position is ‘unreasonable.’55
Nevertheless, despite disagreement over concepts of reason and publicness,
one can see that the role which Islamic pubic reason stands to play in the Islamic
polity is similar to the role which public reason (as explained by Rawls) plays
in the liberal-democratic polity. Its precepts, principles, restrictions, and guideli-
nes provide citizens with a framework of argument, so that reasonable or
51 The point is made well by Kant (A738/B767): ‘Reason depends on … freedom for its very existence. For reason
has no dictatorial authority; its verdict is always simply the agreement of free citizens, of whom each one must
be permitted to express, without let or hindrance, his objection or even his veto.’ See Kant, Critique of Pure Reason
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1965).
52 Abdullahi Ahmad An-Na‘im, Toward an Islamic Reformation: Civil Liberties, Human Rights, and International
Law (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1990).
53 Abdul-Karim Soroush, ‘The Evolution and Devolution of Religious Knowledge,’ in Charles Kurzman, ed.,
Liberal Islam: A Sourcebook (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).
54 Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. xix.
55 Hampton, ‘The Common Faith of Liberalism,’ p. 209.
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compelling arguments may be distinguished from those that are ‘unreasonable.’
The differences between Islamic public reason and (liberal) public reason are
obvious. As to judgments of ultimate superiority (or inferiority), they must await
the resolution of ancient philosophical disagreements about truth, justice and
goodness, a resolution that is not likely to happen.
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